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INTRODUCTION
This Note explores a central question in regime design: can a region
that is arguably averse1 to human rights develop a successful system to
police its own human rights record? Southeast Asia, a region that had, and
arguably still has, a human rights allergy,2 has voluntarily created a human
rights system for itself. Given that this system is institutionally weak by
design,3 a plausible explanation for this paradoxical commitment is that it
is simply disingenuous. Proposing reforms for an apparently disingenuous
human rights system may at first blush appear to be a futile effort. Some
human rights advocates may wish to wait for a different system altogether
instead of celebrating a weak system and improving upon it. However, this
Note argues that through harnessing social processes for influencing state
practice,4 it is possible to stimulate even a disingenuous system to adopt
meaningful changes over time.5
Regional human rights systems6 (Regional Systems) are commitment
devices that nation states in regional blocs use to hold themselves
accountable to their human rights obligations.7 Because states enjoy the

1. HSIEN-LI TAN, THE ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 60–61
(2011) (using “aversion” to describe Southeast Asia’s hesitance and suspicion towards international
human rights law).
2. But see Mergawati Zulfakar and Lisa Goh, Tough Task Ahead on Human Rights, THE STAR
(Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.thestar.com.my/story/?file=%2f2007%2f8%2f1%2f
nation%2f18461803&sec=nation (quoting Foreign Minister Syed Hamid’s aspiration that ASEAN
“must not be seen to be allergic to human rights.”).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–22 (2013); infra Part III.
5. See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 137, 144; infra Part III.
6. Regional human rights systems consist of regional instruments and mechanisms. OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, An Overview of Regional Human Rights Systems,
http://bangkok.ohchr.org/programme/regional-systems.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). Regional
instruments (such as treaties, conventions, and declarations) help to “localise international human rights
norms and standards, reflecting the particular human rights concerns of the region.” Id. Regional
mechanisms (such as commissions and courts) then help to “implement these instruments on the
ground.” Id.
7. See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, Rights and Justice: A Prospective View, in SOUTH ASIA
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sovereign right to determine their own internal affairs without intervention
from other states,8 participating in such commitment devices requires states
to give up some of their sovereignty to allow a supranational body to
monitor and criticize their domestic human rights records.9 For a state with
a poor human rights record, consenting to a strong Regional System creates
self-inflicted wounds—such consent requires significant political will or
commitment to human rights. Given the sovereignty costs of participating
in a Regional System, one may question whether a region that is allergic to
human rights can genuinely desire to establish a Regional System. This
Note contextualizes the struggle in the creation and development of
Regional Systems by examining the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), a sub-regional organization consisting of ten Asian
states.10
ASEAN has asserted that the application of universal human rights
must be subject to regional particularities.11 ASEAN has argued that Asia
has a different value system (Asian values) that may be fundamentally
incompatible with the West’s conception of universal human rights.12
However, despite its longstanding aversion to human rights,13 ASEAN
created a human rights commission in 2009, called the ASEAN
Intergovernmental
Commission
on
Human
Rights
(ASEAN
Commission).14 It later promulgated the ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration (ASEAN Declaration) in late 2012.15

2060: ENVISIONING REGIONAL FUTURES 261, 264 (Adil Najam & Moeed Yusuf eds., 2013) (“A
regional commitment to human rights is an important device to improve conditions on the ground.”).
8. G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981).
9. See DEBRA DELAET, THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 146 (2d ed. 2014)
(“[R]egional human rights systems are typically limited by the fact that states are unwilling to give up
sovereignty in the name of universal human rights.”).
10. ASEAN’s ten member states include the five founding members, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and the later members, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, and Cambodia. The Founding of ASEAN, ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/overview/ (last
visited July 12, 2014).
11. Ben Saul, Jacqueline Mowbray & Irene Baghoomians, The Last Frontier of Human Rights
Protection: Interrogating Resistance to Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, 18 AUSTL. INT’L L. J.
23, 30–31 (2011).
12. Id.; see infra Part I.C.2 for a more elaborate explanation of “Asian values.”
13. TAN, supra note 1 at 60–61.
14. About, ASEAN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://aichr.org/
about/ (last visited July 12, 2014).
15. Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION (Nov. 19,
2012), available at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-humanrights-declaration [hereinafter ASEAN DECLARATION]. For a detailed analysis of the provisions in the
ASEAN Declaration, see Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012,
13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 557 (2013); see also Nicholas Doyle, The Asean Human Rights Declaration And
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Since their inception, the ASEAN Commission and the Declaration
have been flayed and pummeled for being some combination of weak,
silent, and regressive.16 Nevertheless, ASEAN’s struggle with its regional
human rights body and Asian values makes it a promising test case for
whether and how states can construct Regional Systems that are both
culturally sensitive and also effective in protecting internationally
recognized human rights.
Scholars, civil society groups and human rights institutions have
recommended reforms for the ASEAN human rights system.17 However,
ASEAN has not adopted many of these recommendations.18 This Note is
the first attempt since the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration19 to propose
a comprehensive ASEAN human rights framework that is tailored to the
region’s particularities and informed by institutional design literature. After
examining ASEAN’s conditions, the limitations of ASEAN’s existing
system, and other Regional Systems, this Note proposes a human rights
framework for ASEAN that evolves in response to local conditions.
Contrary to the call for strong mechanisms,20 the ASEAN Commission
should first introduce less intrusive mechanisms and build its power
sequentially. This is because strong mechanisms are not just politically
infeasible at the outset—they could also be counterproductive.21 The
evolutionary nature of the proposed framework is in line with ASEAN’s
evolutionary approach for the development of human rights, which
augments its political feasibility.22 More importantly, it also reflects the
lessons learned from other Regional Systems: arriving at an equilibrium
that perfectly balances global norms and local conditions is a process, not a

The Implications of Recent Southeast Asian Initiatives in Human Rights Institution-building and
Standard-setting, 63 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 15–27 (2013).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See, e.g., HAO DUY PHAN, A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO ESTABLISHING A HUMAN RIGHTS
MECHANISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE FOR A SOUTHEAST ASIAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, chs.
5–6 (Roger S. Clark et al. eds., 2012) (proposing an ASEAN Court of Human Rights, which this Note
argues is not feasible in the short run); infra notes 127–132 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 127–132 and accompanying text.
19. For a much earlier analysis of this topic, see Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in
ASEAN Countries: “Promises to keep and miles to go before I sleep,” 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
1, 76–79 (1999).
20. See, e.g., PHAN, supra note 17.
21. Employing strong mechanisms may undercut “softer” mechanisms. See infra note 194 and
accompanying text.
22. Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (TERMS OF REFERENCE), art. 2.5 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.asean.org/
images/archive/publications/TOR-of-AICHR.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN Commission T.O.R.].

14_WANG_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/22/2015 9:48 PM

CONTEXTUALIZING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

389

one-shot attempt.23
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the existing
ASEAN human rights system and its limitations and challenges. Part II
draws lessons from other Regional Systems. Finally, Part III proposes a
multilayered human rights framework for ASEAN.
I. THE CURRENT ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND ITS
CHALLENGES
A. Existing human rights institutions and organizations in ASEAN
1. ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
ASEAN was initially created for political and economic cooperation
in 1967 and did not have human rights on its agenda until the 1990s.24 In
2009, more than four decades after its inception, ASEAN established the
ASEAN Commission.25 The ASEAN Commission is the official
“overarching human rights institution in ASEAN,”26 with a mandate that
includes promoting ASEAN human rights instruments, encouraging the
ratification and implementation of international human rights treaties, and
promoting public awareness of human rights.27 The ASEAN Commission
can also request information about the promotion and protection of human
rights from its member states on a voluntary basis,28 and conduct thematic
studies and reports for ministerial meetings.29 The ASEAN Commission
consists of ten representatives, one appointed by each member state.30
2. ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights
of Women and Children
In addition to the ASEAN Commission, which has a general human
rights mandate, ASEAN has a separate commission, the ASEAN
23. See infra Part II.
24. Sriprapha Petcharamesree, The ASEAN Human Rights Architecture: Its Development and
Challenges, 11 EQUAL RTS. REV. 46, 47 (2013).
25. About, supra note 14; Irene I. Hadiprayitno, The Institutionalisation of Human Rights, in
ASEAN 1 (Dec. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191448.
26. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 6.8.
27. Id. art. 4.3–4.6.
28. Id. art. 4.10. This does not include the authority to require states to submit reports on their
human rights records. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
29. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 4.12–4.13.
30. Daniel Aguirre & Irene Pietropaoli, ASEAN Regional Human Rights Protection: Lessons
from the African and Inter American Regional Systems, 2 NAM YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CULTURAL DIVERSITY154, 167 (Kamran Hashemi & Linda Briskman ed., 2013).
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Commissions on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and
Children (ACWC), focused on a subset of rights that are perceived to be
less politically sensitive.31 Established in 2010,32 the ACWC is also an
intergovernmental consultative body.33 Its mandate is limited to women’s
and children’s rights34 and is explicitly linked to member states’ obligations
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW).35 All ASEAN member states have ratified both conventions,
albeit with reservations.36
ACWC encourages compliance with international and regional human
rights norms,37 raises public awareness of the rights of women and
children,38 and assists with preparing periodic reports to the United Nations
and treaty bodies.39 The ACWC does not impose additional reporting
obligations, but rather serves to complement existing state obligations to
report to the United Nations and treaty bodies.40
3. National Human Rights Institutions and the Asia Pacific Forum of
National Human Rights Institutions
State governments establish National Human Rights Institutions
(NHRIs) to promote and protect human rights in their countries.41 Although
individual NHRIs have differing functions, they also share common ones
such as monitoring the state, investigating and resolving complaints, or
promoting human rights education.42 The Asia Pacific Forum of National
Human Rights Institutions (Asia Pacific Forum) is a network of NHRIs in
31. According to Thai representative to the ASEAN Commission Sriprapha Petchamesree, the
rights of women and children are perceived to be a “soft issue” that is less threatening to ASEAN
members than civil and political liberties. Sriprapha Petcharamesree, The Human Rights Body: A Test
For Democracy Building, in ASEAN 10 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
2009), available at http:// www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Sriprapha_low_2.pdf.
32. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 164.
33. Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ASEAN COMMISSION
FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN art. 4 (Feb. 2010),
available at http://www.asean.org/images/2012/Social_cultural/ACW/TOR-ACWC.pdf [hereinafter
ACWC T.O.R.].
34. Id. art. 2.1.
35. Id. art. 2.5.
36. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 184.
37. ACWC T.O.R., supra note 33, art. 5.1.
38. Id. art. 5.3.
39. Id. art. 5.6.
40. Id. art. 3.4
41. ASIA PAC. FORUM, What are National Human Rights Institutions?, http://www.asiapacific
forum.net/establishment-of-nrhis/what-is-an-nhri (last visited July 12, 2014).
42. Id.
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the Asia Pacific region, including countries outside of ASEAN.43 The Asia
Pacific Forum’s primary roles include strengthening existing NHRIs44 and
supporting the establishment of NHRIs in accordance with the Paris
Principles.45 There are currently five NHRIs in the ASEAN region—in the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar.46 Four NHRIs
(excluding Myanmar) have established their own network, called the
ASEAN NHRI Forum.47 The ASEAN NHRI Forum has held several
consultation meetings and developed working plans for regional
collaboration and strategies for the promotion and protection of human
rights.48 These four NHRIs conform to the Paris Principles:49 they are
independent from the state and are vested with the competence to promote
and protect human rights.50 However, Myanmar’s NHRI does not conform
to the Paris Principles and thus does not have full membership in the Asia
Pacific Forum.51
4. Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism
The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism
(Working Group) is a coalition of national working groups whose members
are representatives from governments, academia, and civil society
organizations.52 The Working Group is the only human rights civil society
organization affiliated with ASEAN.53 Its primary goal was to establish an

43. Andrea Durbach, Catherine Renshaw & Andrew Byrnes, A Tongue but No Teeth: The
Emergence of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in the Asia Pacific Region, 31 SYDNEY L. REV.
211, 212 (2009).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 226. The Paris Principles provide minimum standards on competence and responsibilities, composition, guarantees of independence and pluralism, methods of operation and the status
of commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence. Principles Relating to the Status of National
Institutions (The Paris Principles), G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134
(Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Paris Principles].
46. NHRIs in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were established in 1987, 1993,
2000, and 2001 respectively. Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 215.
47. See Press Release, Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines, ASEAN Human Rights
Commissions Convene in Manila (Jan. 25, 2008).
48. Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 227.
49. INT’L COORDINATING COMM. OF NAT’L INST. FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROT. OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, CHART OF THE STATUS OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 2–3 (Dec. 30, 2014), http://nhri.ohchr.org/
EN/Documents/Accreditation%20Status%20Chart.pdf.
50. Paris Principles, supra note 45.
51. Associate Members, ASIA PACIFIC FORUM, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/members/
associate-members (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
52. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15; Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 222.
53. Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN CHARTER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, Annex 2 (Nov. 20 2007), available at http://www.aseansec.org/
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intergovernmental human rights commission for ASEAN, 54 though most of
its recommendations for the ASEAN Commission were rejected.55 It now
assists in the promotion of human rights and provides recommendations to
ASEAN organs.56 It has also “become a platform where negotiations
regarding alleged human rights violations between non-State and State
actors . . . can be carried out.”57
B. Evaluation of the current ASEAN human rights system and the
ASEAN Declaration
1. Limitations of existing ASEAN institutions
ASEAN officials lauded the ASEAN Commission as a “historic
milestone” in human rights promotion and protection.58 However, a close
inspection of the ASEAN Commission’s terms of reference indicates that
ASEAN member states have in fact substantially restricted the
Commission’s authority.59 Among commentators and human rights
advocates, criticisms of the ASEAN Commission abound. It has been
called “the world’s most toothless human-rights body,”60 “a lame duck,”61
and mere “window dressing.”62 Even some representatives to the ASEAN
Commission are frustrated by the Commission’s limited power.63
The ASEAN Commission is an “intergovernmental” political entity—

publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.
54. About Us, Working Grp. for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, http://wvw.aseanhrmech.
org/aboutus.html (last visited July 12, 2014).
55. See infra Section I.C.3.
56. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15; Petchamesree, supra note 24, at 48–49.
57. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15
58. ASEAN, Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights arts. 4, 8 (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/documents/ Declarationaichr.pdf.
59. See, e.g., ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 2.1 (restricting the ASEAN
Commission’s actions by emphasizing non-interference and state sovereignty in the first guiding
principle).
60. ASEAN’s Toothless Council, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970203517304574303592053848748.
61. Sarinna Areethamsirikul, Can Indonesia Become the Central Leader of Asean?, THE NATION,
(Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/03/22/opinion/Can-Indonesiabecome-the-central-leader-of-Asean-30151407.html.
62. Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy, AICHR: A Window Dressing for ASEAN’s
Commitment to Human Rights (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.forum- asia.org/?p=6901 (last
visited July 12, 2014).
63. One representative to the ASEAN Commission expressed disappointment and apologized for
the Commission’s inability to respond to the complaints submitted by NGOs at the ASEAN
Commission’s inception. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 13.
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its lack of independence from member governments is evident from its very
name. The ASEAN Commission is comprised of government appointees
accountable to their governments,64 who can remove the appointees at their
discretion.65 It operates by consultation and consensus, which gives each
state an effective veto over the Commission’s decisions.66 The ASEAN
Commission has no permanent secretariat or office, and no ability to hear
complaints, initiate independent investigations,67 or monitor compliance.68
It is not even authorized to require states to produce periodic reports on
their progress in implementing the human rights instruments that they have
ratified.69
The ASEAN Commission is also designed to avoid lateral pressure
from governments outside of ASEAN.70 External funding and resources
directed towards the ASEAN Commission are limited to the promotion of
human rights; non-ASEAN governments cannot fund activities that protect
human rights, such as review, monitoring, and enforcement.71 Further,
since the ASEAN Commission’s inception, it has largely excluded civil
society organizations (CSOs) from participation in its initiatives, including
drafting of the ASEAN Declaration.72 Thus, it has been criticized as “an
intergovernmental body that won’t even talk to its own citizens.”73
The ACWC faces normative and institutional challenges.74 Even
though all ASEAN member states have ratified the relevant U.N. treaties
CEDAW and CRC, many states have entered reservations to their essential
provisions.75 Consequently, there is no consensus on the legal standard for
64. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 5.2.
65. Id. art. 5.6.
66. John D. Ciorciari, Institutionalizing Human Rights in Southeast Asia, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 695,
715 (2012).
67. Id. The inability to receive complaints from victims of human rights violations “may be the
Commission’s most hobbling handicap.” Id. at 719. The ASEAN Commission refused to consider all of
the complaints submitted to it, including one concerning a massacre of fifty-six journalists and relatives
of a political opposition candidate in the Philippines. Id. at 719–20.
68. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 166.
69. Silvia Croydon, Two Rights Paths: East Asia’s Emerging Regional Human Rights
Framework, 11 ASIA PAC. PERSP. 22, 29 (2013).
70. Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 716–17.
71. See id.; ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 8.6.
72. Renshaw, supra note 15, at 2.
73. Sri Wahyuni, ASEAN Human Rights Body Deemed “Toothless,” JAKARTA POST, Oct. 24,
2009, at 2.
74. See generally Ciorciari, supra note 66 (describing various normative and institutional
constraints facing the ASEAN Commission and ACWC).
75. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 184. Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, and Malaysia have
entered reservations to essential provisions of CEDAW or general reservations. Id. For a summary of
ratification and reservations by ASEAN member states, see Suzannah Linton, ASEAN States, Their
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women’s and children’s rights.76 Also, ACWC’s role could overlap
significantly with that of the ASEAN Commission, since the former
ASEAN Secretary-General advised the ASEAN Commission to focus on
the rights of women, children, and migrant workers first.77 Given that the
ACWC has to coordinate with the ASEAN Commission but is not
subordinate to it,78 this can result in a turf war and a competition for
funding.79
2. Why ASEAN created the ASEAN Commission
The reasons motivating states to participate in international human
rights regimes help explain how these regimes can influence state
behavior.80 Thus, in designing a workable ASEAN human rights
framework, it is essential to understand why ASEAN created the ASEAN
Commission, and its vision for the ASEAN Regional System in general.
Remarks from ASEAN and state government officials suggest that
ASEAN’s decision to create the ASEAN Commission was partly out of
pressure to catch up with human rights developments in the international
community and to “keep ASEAN relevant.”81 The ASEAN Commission
could also be a public relations stunt to change the world’s perception, if
any, that ASEAN is “allergic to human rights.”82 Notwithstanding the
desire to match other Regional Systems, ASEAN’s vision for the ASEAN
Commission is a body limited by political reality. A senior official at the
ASEAN Secretariat stated, “to moan about [the ASEAN Commission’s
lack of independence] is to bark up the wrong tree,”83 because it was
unrealistic to start the ASEAN Commission as a strong body:
[T]he dilemma facing ASEAN members states . . . is how to
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Proposed ASEAN Commission on Women and
Children, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 436 (2008).
76. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 184.
77. Kor Kian Beng, Human Rights Struggle, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore) (Oct. 23, 2009).
78. ACWC T.O.R., supra note 33, art. 7.7.
79. See Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 722.
80. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, International Regimes for Human Rights, 15 ANN. REV. POLIT.
SCI. 265, 280 (2012).
81. James Munro, Why States Create International Human Rights Mechanisms: The ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and Democratic Lock-in Theory, 10 ASIA-PAC. J.
HUM. RTS. 1, 23 (2009). ASEAN Secretary-General Pitsuwan explained that the “[human rights] issue
is important in our interface with other organizations, with our dialogue partners, because this is an
issue of concern to the international community.” Id. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas also
remarked, “[h]ow can we avoid having the [ASEAN human rights body] when all other regional
organizations have one already” and stated that the ASEAN human rights body should be “in line with
the demands of the [twenty-first] century.” Id.
82. See Zulfakar & Goh, supra note 2.
83. Croydon, supra note 69, at 29.
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reconcile national political reality with new regional obligation[s] to
promote and protect human rights. The ASEAN human rights body
is expected to be “realistic,” “credible,” “workable,” “effective,”
“evolving” and most importantly “acceptable” to all member
states . . . . As such, the ASEAN human rights body is never
intended to be a stand-alone independent entity—let alone an
autonomous regional watchdog with “sharp teeth.”84

Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo stated that instead, the
body would “at least have a tongue[,] and a tongue will have its uses.”85
Scholars have diverging views regarding ASEAN’s motivations for
creating an ASEAN human rights body. Some believe that ASEAN created
the ASEAN Commission in order to obtain international legitimacy and
appease the outside world.86 ASEAN states could also be motivated by the
fear that the human rights movement, particularly the push for political and
civil rights, could lead to domestic instability and forced democratization.87
Others warned that, in institutionalizing the ASEAN Commission, ASEAN
could “imprison”88 human rights in “a controlled bureaucratic
environment.”89 This allows ASEAN to “deflect[] criticism by discussing
human rights in a safe political space [where] . . . government officials
control the pace and content of the discourse.”90 However, the ASEAN
Commission could also constitute an important first step towards stronger
protection of human rights and help to solidify norms.91
The plausible, if troubling, view is that ASEAN chose to create the
ASEAN Commission to relieve pressure for real change. The ASEAN
Commission’s deliberately weak institutional design seems to be a
placating statement with no real effect.92 Such disingenuous participation

84. Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 713.
85. Id.
86. Munro, supra note 81, at 24; see also Christof Heyns & Magnus Kilander, Towards Minimum
Standards For Regional Human Rights Systems, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W MICHAEL REISMAN 31 (2010) (arguing that the ASEAN
Commission could shield governments from criticism for human rights violations rather than prevent
violations given the absence of independent authority and oversight); Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the
Gap? The Role of Regional and National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific, 13 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POL’Y J. 174, 176 (2011) (identifying the danger that the ASEAN Commission could undermine,
instead of complement, international human rights standards).
87. Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 701.
88. Id. at 720.
89. Id. at 697.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. This is analogous to Oona Hathaway’s view that states participate in treaties and human rights
regimes because weak international enforcement mechanisms allow states to pay lip service to human
rights without fulfilling the commitments. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do human rights treaties make a
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might backfire if CSOs can hold governments locally accountable.93 This is
because international civil society could increase recognition, reporting,
and publicity of local violations, thereby creating more pressure on
governments to address human rights problems.94 However, this requires a
tight link between the governments and international civil society,95 which
may be absent in the ASEAN region.
3. Significance of the ASEAN Declaration
The ASEAN Commission has done little since its establishment in
2009, apart from overseeing the drafting of the ASEAN Declaration. The
ASEAN Declaration is not the product of a democratic process. Rather, the
drafting process was “controversial” because of the ASEAN Commission’s
lack of independence, the lack of transparency, and exclusion of CSOs
from the process.96 An optimistic interpretation of the ASEAN Declaration
is that it constitutes “another step towards the development of a human
rights architecture”97 and undermines ASEAN’s claim that human rights is
a Western imposition.98
However, the text of the ASEAN Declaration arguably falls below
international standards for human rights.99 Although the ASEAN
Declaration’s preamble reaffirms ASEAN’s commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international obligations,100 the
Declaration broadly limits all rights and fails to include several basic
rights.101 This has caused civil society to denounce it.102 The ASEAN

difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 2005 (2002).
93. Emilie Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human rights in a globalizing world: the paradox
of empty promises, 110 AM. J. SOCIOL. 1373, 1385–86 (2005); H. SMITH-CANNOY, INSINCERE
COMMITMENTS: HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, ABUSIVE STATES, AND CITIZEN ACTIVISM 174–75 (2012).
94. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 93, at 1386.
95. Id.
96. Renshaw, supra note 15, at 2. No drafts of the ASEAN Declaration were made public,
although two of them were leaked. Id.
97. Petcharamesree, supra note 24, at 58.
98. See Renshaw, supra note 15, at 23.
99. See U.N. Daily News, U.N. Official Welcomes ASEAN Commitment to Human Rights, but
Concerned Over Declaration Wording, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Nov. 15, 2012, available at http://www.un.
org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43536#.Upqyf41Q2XR.
100. ASEAN DECLARATION, supra note 15.
101. Human Rights Watch, Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 19, 2012, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/1
9/civil-society-denounces-adoption-flawed-asean-human-rights-declaration (last visited July 12, 2014)
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch]. Article 8 of the ASEAN Declaration is a general principle that
could limit all rights, including non-derogable ones under international law. Renshaw, supra note 15, at
13. The ASEAN Declaration excludes the right to self-determination, the rights of indigenous peoples,
id., and the right to freedom of association.
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Declaration also leaves unresolved the awkward tension between the
aspiration to endorse universal human rights and the reluctance to cede
state sovereignty.103 The ramifications of this ambivalence could be severe.
As one scholar’s scathing criticism of ASEAN Declaration explains:
ASEAN’s human rights initiative, far from facilitating ASEAN
States’ compliance with treaty and customary human rights
obligations, has been, and is likely to remain, ineffective and even
antagonistic . . . . The [ASEAN Declaration] is a declaratory
statement which purports to fragment the human rights norms
recognized by some ASEAN States between the intra- and extraASEAN context . . . . [T]he [ASEAN Declaration] does not achieve
a local-global reconciliation but rather an ossification of their
skeptical position on human rights with little evidence of “novel”
rights reflecting “regional particularities.”104

The adoption of a regional instrument that plausibly undermines
international human rights standards is likely to complicate the ASEAN
Commission’s work in the future. It is difficult to promote and expand on
an instrument that is contested and contains fractured legal standards. If the
ASEAN Declaration were to evolve into a binding convention, as some
soft-law declarations do,105 its fractured standards have to be clarified so
that it could be implemented in accordance with universal standards. These
challenges, in addition to others described in the following section, mean
that it is unlikely that the ASEAN Declaration will turn into a binding
convention in the short run.
C. Challenges to establishing an effective human rights framework in
ASEAN
1. Principle of non-interference and ASEAN’s modus operandi
The region espouses an “extreme deference to state sovereignty
understood in almost absolutist terms.”106 The principle of non-interference
in states’ domestic affairs is explicitly included in the ASEAN
Commission’s terms of reference107 and the ASEAN Charter.108 Many

102. Human Rights Watch, supra note 101.
103. Renshaw, supra note 15, at 578.
104. Doyle, supra note 15, at 98.
105. Soft-law declarations sometimes pave the way for binding instruments. For example, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights evolved into the legally binding International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
106. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 179 (4th ed. 2013).
107. Heyns & Kilander, supra note 86, at 30; ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 2.1.
108. Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN CHARTER, art. 2.2(e) (Nov. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.
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scholars identify this principle as a major challenge for regional human
rights in ASEAN,109 as states are neither willing to criticize nor receive
criticism. In addition, the “ASEAN way” of doing business through
consultation and consensus110—read: veto power by each state—further
restrains when and how ASEAN and the ASEAN Commission can act.
Diverse political, cultural, and economic positions within the region make
forming consensus around norms difficult.111 The result is a reluctance to
impose sanctions on deviant members, slow decision-making process, and
a weak ASEAN Commission. Further, most ASEAN states have rejected
alternative methods of decision-making such as constructive and flexible
engagement.112 Thus, the proposed framework would likely have to work
within the constraints of the current ASEAN method of consensus
decision-making and persuasion.
2. ASEAN’s views on human rights: cultural relativism and Asian
values
As Singapore has declared, rights are “contested concepts.”113
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia promoted the principal cultural
relativist objection to the universality of human rights using Asian values,

109. Thio, supra note 19, at 6 (identifying non-interference as a “cardinal principle” for ASEAN);
John Arendshorst, The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN
Charter, 8 NW. UJ INT’L HUM. RTS. 102, 115 (2009); Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 237; Saul et al.,
supra note 11, at 35. However, some have argued that adherence to the non-interference principle has
weakened because the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 exposed the need for interdependence and
regional integration. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 4–5.
110. Hsien-Li Tan, The ASEAN Human Rights Body: Incorporating Forgotten Promises for Policy
Coherence and Efficacy, 12 SINGAPORE Y.B. OF INT’L LAW 239, 240 (2008).
111. Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 217; Renshaw, supra note 15, at 577; Saul et al., supra note
11, at 28.
112. Thio, supra note 19, at 53–54. Although it is unclear whether Malaysia or Thailand is
responsible for first suggesting each concept, they are the only two ASEAN states that advocate for
these concepts. Compare id. (attributing constructive engagement to Malaysia and flexible engagement
to Thailand), with Petcharamesree, supra note 24, at 57 (attributing constructive engagement to
Thailand and flexible engagement to Mayalsia but confirming that besides Malaysia and Thailand, all
ASEAN states have rejected these concepts since 1999). As opposed to nonintervention, constructive
engagement is a “more proactive response to manage the spill[]over effects of certain domestic . . .
crises . . . though ‘constructive intervention’ to prevent the escalation of problems.” Thio, supra note
19, at 53. Flexible engagement asserts that non-interference is not an absolute principle, and allows
states to openly criticize other states’ domestic policies when these policies have transnational effects
that impact them. Id. at 53–54.
113. Permanent Mission of Singapore to the United Nations, U.N. G.A. 60th Sess. High-level Plen.
Mtg. (Sep. 16, 2005), http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements16/sin050916eng.pdf (“[A]ll
but a handful of what are asserted to be rights are still essentially contested concepts.”); see Durbach,
supra note 43, at 224; TAN, supra note 1, at 173 (quoting Singapore as stating that “the interpretation of
most rights is still essentially contested concepts [sic]” at the Seventh Workshop on the ASEAN
Regional Mechanism on Human Rights in 2008).
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which first appeared in the international spotlight through the Bangkok
Declaration, right before the 1993 Vienna Conference.114 The Bangkok
Declaration was a document signed by over forty Asian states.115 It stated
what has now come to be the Asian values position, which calls for
attention to regional and cultural particularity as opposed to the universality
of human rights.116 To the extent that regions possess generalizable cultural
values, Asia values “communitarian, family-centered and nonindividualistic belief systems,” whereas the West values “egalitarianism,
individualism and liberal democratic beliefs.”117 The Asian values position
highlights that human rights is a Western concept, and thus a form of “postcolonial, cultural imperialism.”118 Asian values proponents use culture
“both to assert an exception, or opposition, to a certain type of human
rights and to argue that international law should protect their culture.”119
Although some ASEAN countries have attempted to characterize this
contestation as coming from ASEAN or Asia as a singular bloc that shares
Asian values, neither the Asian nor ASEAN region observes one set of
homogenous Asian Values or espouses one particular conception of human
rights.120 Even within countries that champion Asian Values, perspectives
on human rights diverge.121 Although some scholars argue that relativism
may be receding,122 the ASEAN Declaration contains language to the
contrary.123 Thus, it is uncertain whether the ASEAN Declaration has lain
to rest the cultural relativism debate.124
3. Lack of political will
The history of ASEAN’s interaction with human rights shows that the

114. Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: the Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 291, 311 (1999).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. BADEN OFFORD, HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2003).
118. Id. at 32.
119. Engle, supra note 114, at 312.
120. Saul et al., supra note 11, at 28–31.
121. For example, Singapore has been a vociferous champion of Asian Values, and has insisted
that human rights are Western concepts. OFFORD, supra note 117, at 5–6. However, Chee Soon Juan,
Secretary General of the Singapore Democratic Party (an opposition party) has exerted that “the longing
for equality, justice, and freedom is not Asian or Western—it is primordial.” Id. at 41.
122. Linton, supra note 75, at 482.
123. See supra Part I.B.3.
124. A member of the Philippines drafting team described the ASEAN Declaration as the ASEAN
Magna Carta that finally ends the remnant of cultural relativism, but the U.S. State Department objects
to the ASEAN Declaration precisely on the grounds that it endorses cultural relativism. Renshaw, supra
note 15, at 558–59.
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primary reason for a weak ASEAN human rights system is deeper than a
simple lack of capacity to implement. Rather, it is a lack of political will.
The process for developing a human rights system for the region has been
described as a “long and winding road.”125 ASEAN has a long history of
producing declarations126 without the appetite for binding human rights
instruments. The ASEAN Commission is institutionally weak, but not for a
lack of trying. Many prior proposals to shape the ASEAN Commission’s
powers have failed. For example, “proposals for a commission that
constituted comprehensive human rights protection and reporting
mechanisms had been denied by authoritarian ASEAN member states.”127
The Working Group asked for a commission with both protective and
promotional functions, but the ASEAN Commission was restricted to only
promotional functions.128 Member states also refused the Working Group’s
request for a concrete timeframe for the ASEAN Commission’s growth and
evolution.129 The states also refused to allow elected representatives to be
independent from member states,130 instead reserving the right to remove
them at will.131 Even though the NHRIs of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand recommended that the ASEAN Commission be
empowered to conduct country visits,132 the states did not include this
ability in the ASEAN Commission’s mandate. The lack of political will for

125. Vitit Muntarbhorn, A Roadmap for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (May 28–29, 2003),
http://www.fnf.org.ph/liberallibrary/roadmap-for-asean-human-rights.htm (last visited July 12, 2014).
126. See Petcharamesree, supra note 24, at 47–48 (describing a series of non-binding documents
produced by ASEAN that mention human rights).
127. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 164.
128. WORKING GRP. FOR AN ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM, Proposed Elements for the
Terms of Reference of an ASEAN Human Rights Body, http://www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/WGsub
missiontoHLP.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Working Group Proposal]; see WORKING
GRP. FOR AN ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM, Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism Welcomes the Imminent Creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights, http://www.aseanhrmech.org/news/creation-of-asean-intergovernmental-commission.htm (last
visited July 12, 2014) (“It is apparent that the current [ASEAN Commission Terms of Reference] is not
what we aspired for.”).
129. The Working Group stated that there should be a “credible timeframe for every stage of the
evolutionary process” of the ASEAN Commission. Working Group Proposal, supra note 128, ¶ 19.
130. Maruah Singapore, a human rights NGO in Singapore, proposed that the representatives
should “act as principals in their own right and not as representatives of their states.” Maruah
Singapore, Position Paper on the Proposed ASEAN Human Right Body ¶ 33–34 (Sep. 9, 2008),
http://maruahsg.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/maruah-position-paper-10-sept-2008.pdf.
131. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 5.6.
132. Human Rights Nat’l Comm’n of Indon. [Komnas HAM], Human Rights Comm’n of Malay.
[SUHAKAM], Comm’n on Human Rights of the Phil. [CHRP] & Nat’l Human Rights Comm’n of
Thai. [NHRCT], Position Paper of the National Human Rights Institutions of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand on Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Human Rights Body 2 (Sep. 11, 2008),
available at http://seanf.asia/index.php/component/attachments/download/33.
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strong mechanisms directly limits the feasibility of proposals for the
ASEAN Commission, and this Note’s recommendations are made in light
of ASEAN’s tendency to reject proposals.
II. LESSONS FROM OTHER REGIONAL SYSTEMS
Designing a human rights framework suitable for ASEAN also
requires a survey of other Regional Systems, with a particular focus on how
well they have worked and why. The three main Regional Systems—
European, Inter-American, and African—have all adopted a three-pronged
combination: convention, commission, and court.133 Some have argued that
a Regional System requires, at the very least, the three-pronged
combination in order to be complete.134 This is because conventions spell
out the terms of states’ commitments, commissions promote and monitor
implementation, and courts adjudicate disputes and enforce the
convention.135 The European Regional System has seen much success using
this framework.136 The Inter-American and African Regional Systems have
also benefited from the framework,137 though they are still works in
progress, as there have been some instances of state non-compliance.138
It is important to note that Regional Systems evolve over time and do
not apply the same standards and mechanisms to all countries, especially in
their early years.139 The three main Regional Systems did not adopt the
three-pronged combination from the outset.140 Instead, the progressive

133. Tan, supra note 110, at 244. As the European System evolved, it merged its commission into
its court. John G. Merrills, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/196097/European-Court-of-Human-Rights-ECHR.
134. See, e.g., Maruah Singapore, supra note 130, at 4.
135. See id.
136. See HaoDuy Phan, The Evolution Towards an ASEAN Human Rights Body, 9 ASIA-PAC. J. ON
HUM. RTS. & L. 1, 1 (2008) (arguing that experiences from Europe, Latin America, and Africa show
that Regional Systems bring more good news than bad, and the sooner a mechanism is put into effect,
the more the population benefits from it).
137. Id.
138. For an examination of non-compliance within the Inter-American system, see Alexandra
Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons From the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce
Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 504 (describing the implementation crisis of the InterAmerican system). For an example of non-compliance within the African system, see infra note 162–
163 and accompanying text.
139. See Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177 (noting that the Inter-American and African
systems “did not appear fully formed” but “represent a slow evolution of diverse views towards
consensus.”); see also PHAN, supra note 17, at 171 (observing that participating in the Inter-American,
European, and African Courts were optional for member states, and thus the courts only had jurisdiction
over some but not all member states in the courts’ early years).
140. For the European system, the convention first entered into force in 1953, then the commission
was established in 1954, followed by the court in 1959, and in 1998, the commission merged into the
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introduction of each prong took a significant period of time.141
For example, it took France, Greece, and Switzerland twenty-four
years to ratify the European Convention.142 The legally binding American
Convention only came into force thirty years after the American
Declaration, which eleven Organization of American States (OAS)
members have not yet ratified.143 The African Charter establishing the
African Commission was adopted eighteen years after the Organization of
African Unity (now African Union) was established.144 When the European
Convention entered into force in 1953, only two countries recognized the
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) jurisdiction, and the Court did
not receive the required number of recognitions to exist until six years
later.145 In addition, there is no fixed order for introducing the three prongs.
For example, the Inter-American Commission operated for about ten years
without a convention through successfully applying a non-binding
declaration.146
All of the systems first implemented the least intrusive mechanisms
and incrementally progressed to the strongest mechanism—the court.147 For
example, the Inter-American Commission had weak mechanisms during its
initial years, but later used its ability to publish reports to forcefully indict
and investigate member governments,148 and even heads of states.149 Even
when the courts were eventually introduced, they did not apply to all
member countries, but rather only to the subset that had consented through
optional protocols.150 The regional courts also started out with limited

court. PHAN, supra note 17, at 162–63. The African system started with the African Charter as its
substantive instrument (adopted in 1981), which established the African Commission, and more than
two decades later, the African Court was established in 2004. Catherine Renshaw, Understanding the
New ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: The Limits and Potential of Theory 18
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=170
6451. The Inter-American system started with the American Declaration in 1948, established the
commission in 1959 and then a decade later adopted the convention that created the court. PHAN, supra
note 17, at 165 n.179, 165–67.
141. See supra note 140.
142. PHAN, supra note 17, at 162.
143. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 96.
144. Renshaw, supra note 140.
145. PHAN, supra note 17, at 163.
146. Id. at 167.
147. See supra note 140.
148. See Tom J Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a
Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 510–12 (1997).
149. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 172.
150. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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accessibility.151 Even the now-powerful ECHR did not accept individual
complaints directly until 1998, and before then, it was part of a two-tiered
system in which cases were funneled through a commission before
reaching the Court.152
Some scholars have proposed guidelines for Regional Systems based
on the three main Regional Systems’ best practices and commonalities,153
which the ASEAN Commission could adopt. There are several lessons
from the European experience. First, the most effective institutions “rely on
prior sociological, ideological and institutional convergence toward
common norms.”154 Second, the binding constraint on human rights
enforcement is the lack of consensus rather than weak institutions.155
Lastly, while waiting for a supranational court, “promising strategies may
be to strengthen domestic civil society and political institutions, and to
strengthen traditional international organizations that gather information
and arrange consultations.”156
However, of the three main Regional Systems, the African and InterAmerican systems are perhaps more useful because these regions share
many similarities with Southeast Asia, including “high diversity of political
regimes, different levels of economic development, and some serious
human rights problems.”157 The African regional system is the newest and
weakest of the three main systems,158 and has faced challenges most similar
to those of the ASEAN system. Its substantive instrument, the African
Charter, is “riddled with clawback clauses that weaken the protection” of
human rights, emphasize individual duties, and advances the idea of
collective people’s rights.159 African states also espoused firm notions of
state sovereignty and non-intervention in the 1960s and 1970s, during
which the Organization of African Unity ignored alleged human rights
violations in member states based on the principle of non-interference.160

151. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. Individuals still do not have standing to file
petitions directly with the Inter-American and African courts. Simone Wegmann, Regional Human
Rights Systems—A Comparative Analysis, GENEVA LABORATORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 25, 28
(2012), available at http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/Publications/GreenLab/Wegmann.pdf.
152. See Wegmann, supra note 151, at 25–26.
153. See Heyns & Kilander, supra note 86, at 25–27.
154. Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and
Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 157, 178 (1995).
155. Id. at 181.
156. Id. at 182.
157. PHAN, supra note 17, at 161.
158. See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 98.
159. Id.
160. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 156–58 (2d ed. 2012).
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Yet, despite these difficulties, the African Commission has helped nudge
African states towards accepting the legitimacy of regional scrutiny.161
Nevertheless, Africa’s experience also cautions against using overly
strong mechanisms before the time is ripe. For example, in 2011, the
government of Libya used brutal force against civilian protestors in
contravention of international human rights and humanitarian law.162 The
African Court’s provisional measures against Libya were “completely
ignored,”163 and although the Court’s measures indicate that it will play an
important role in addressing Africa’s human rights crises,164 this incidence
shows that the risk of noncompliance is real when states lack commitment.
When states consent to the court’s jurisdiction without the requisite intent
to follow through, the Regional System needs to turn to other actors to
intervene, a conditionality that may not be realized for less egregious
violations. States’ perpetual delinquency could result in the
institutionalization of noncompliance, detracting from the purpose of the
Regional System. In sum, political will could be the single most important
contributor to a strong Regional System.165 Though the institution of
mechanisms should not always be conservative, it should at least be
informed by the sufficiency of the political will to comply with them.
III. AN INTEGRATED HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR ASEAN
There is hope that the ASEAN Commission will be strengthened in
the coming years, since its terms of reference were due for review in
2014,166 and civil society and experts have advocated for stronger
protection mandates.167 So far, no changes have been made to the terms of
reference, and Myanmar is only likely to conduct the review in 2016.168

161. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 99. This progress can also be attributed to the agitation caused
by several dictators’ human rights abuses, concern for human rights in international politics, and the
democratization of some African states. VILJOEN, supra note 160, at 158–59. For the evolutionary
process of the regional human rights framework in Africa, see id. at 151–69.
162. Dan Juma, Provisional Measures Under The African Human Rights System: The African
Court’s Order Against Libya, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 344, 364 (2012).
163. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 99.
164. Juma, supra note 162, at 373.
165. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: a Regime Analysis, 40 INT’L ORG. 599, 636
(1986).
166. The ASEAN Commission’s terms of reference was due for review five years after its entry
into force. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 9.6. The terms of reference entered into
force in 2009. TAN, supra note 1, at 157.
167. Nyan Lynn Aung, Calls Grow For Review Of Regional Human Rights Body, MYNAMAR
TIMES (July 4, 2014), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/10894-calls-grow-for-reviewof-regional-human-rights-body.html.
168. Id.

14_WANG_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

CONTEXTUALIZING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

6/22/2015 9:48 PM

405

ASEAN’s regional framework must strike a difficult balance between
being sufficiently tailored to local conditions while avoiding “the kind of
arbitrary, political interpretation of actions that leads to human rights
violations in the first place.”169 The framework proposed below is not
intended to be the infallible or ultimate model. Rather, it is an attempt to
contribute to the ongoing effort to find the right balance, which is an
ambitious project, to say the very least.
Current research concerning the ASEAN human rights system
recognizes the importance of an evolutionary approach.170 Indeed, the
Working Group recommends an evolutionary process for the ASEAN
Commission’s development, where the Commission would initially address
only women and children’s rights and its findings will not be binding.171
However, many other suggestions and ideas are thrown into the field
without a comprehensive evaluation of how they could work together.
Suggestions range from adopting only soft mechanisms to a full-fledged
ASEAN court of human rights.172 Implementing a range of mechanisms by
trial and error without delving into the complicated behavioral logic,
effectiveness, and causality theories may seem harmless. However, this
approach may undermine the system’s purpose.173 Sequencing and careful
selection of mechanisms is important because some strategies could
potentially be incompatible when used in combination. For example,
coercive tactics can undercut efforts to foster acculturation.174
This Note seeks to harness the processes of state socialization to
improve regime design, and adopts Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’
integrated model of state socialization.175 There are three processes of
social influence through which states and institutions may change the
behavior of other states: material inducement, persuasion, and

169. Thio, supra note 19, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See Renshaw, supra note 144, at 18 (“ASEAN would not be the first of the world’s regional
human rights bodies to achieve an effective human rights body by accretion, not design.”); Aguirre &
Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177 (observing that other Regional Systems slowly evolved into what they
are today).
171. Working Group Proposal, supra note 128, ¶ 17–18.
172. See Aung, supra note 167 (“[T]here were two schools of direction in reviewing and amending
the terms of reference of [the ASEAN Commission]. The first one was making a radical change and the
second was using the existing terms with creative interpretation.”); PHAN, supra note 17 at 5
(recommending an ASEAN Court of Human Rights); Thio, supra note 19, at 78–79 (recommending
softer mechanisms such as publicity and persuasion and arguing that a court is not likely to emerge in
the foreseeable future).
173. See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, 123–24.
174. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
175. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at ch.9.
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acculturation.176 Material inducement involves using material rewards and
punishments to change the behavior of states, and does not necessarily
change the underlying preferences of the target state.177 Persuasion occurs
when states are convinced of the “truth, validity, or appropriateness of a
norm, belief, or practice,” and change their minds to internalize the
norm.178 Acculturation is where states mimic the beliefs and behavior of the
surrounding culture, “without actively assessing either the merits of those
beliefs and behaviors or the material costs and benefits of conforming to
them.”179 Acculturation is driven by cognitive and social pressures to
conform to a reference group, and may lead to outward conformity with a
norm without privately accepting the norm or changing private practices.180
The current ASEAN Regional System is likely the result of
acculturation.181 ASEAN created the ASEAN Commission in part to catch
up with the development of Regional Systems in the rest of the world, but
the Commission is institutionally weak by design and the ASEAN
Declaration seeks to redefine human rights from an ASEAN perspective.
This indicates that ASEAN created its Regional System mainly due to
acculturative pressures to conform to human rights developments in the rest
of the world, without completely internalizing or agreeing with the
substance of universal human rights norms. This decoupling of formal
structures from internal demands is an empirical indicator of
acculturation.182 Specifically, the current ASEAN Regional System exhibits
category two decoupling—public conformity to global human rights that is
disconnected from local practices because of incomplete acceptance.183 A
major concern is that acculturation is unable to eliminate this decoupling,
leaving a perpetual gap between nominal commitment and actual
implementation.184
However, although acculturation can result in seemingly shallow or
disingenuous commitment to universal human rights, it can also translate
them into meaningful changes over time.185 That is, decoupling need not be
a permanent stage, but rather the first step towards deeper, progressive

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 27–28.
See Munro, supra note 81, at 22.
GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 43.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 136–37.
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change.186 Acculturative pressures can continue to compel actors toward
conformity in the post-adoption, implementation stage.187 Furthermore,
several processes can translate shallow commitments into meaningful
adoption of the global human rights model.188 These include shifts in
political opportunity structure, the “civilizing force of hypocrisy,”
escalating demands of global civil society, and state learning.189 The
proposed framework incorporates these processes to accelerate progression.
If these processes fail to eliminate decoupling, the framework suggests
harnessing other socialization processes such as persuasion and material
inducement to reduce the gap between formal commitment and actual
practice, after acculturation has inspired commitment to human rights.190
The proposed framework does not necessarily sacrifice effectiveness
for political feasibility. Given ASEAN’s resistance towards adversarial or
coercive intrusions into state sovereignty and a lack of political will for
establishing binding enforcement mechanisms, the ASEAN Commission
should start by engaging governments using mechanisms that appear least
intrusive to state sovereignty. Some may argue that we should not give up
on pushing for stronger mechanisms just because it is politically difficult.
Indeed, material inducements signal that the community condemns the
proscribed behavior, and the absence of punishment might signal that the
community does not strongly support the norm.191 However, this expressive
value of punishment might work only when the proscribed behavior is
already “broadly, unequivocally, and manifestly understood as
inappropriate.”192 Premature punishment, prior to the institutionalization of
a norm, “can also result in a (greater) backlash by norm violators who feel
unjustly penalized.”193 Linking information about state violation to
penalties can also force such information underground, incentivizing states
to conceal the very information that would be useful to acculturation and
persuasion.194 Thus, material inducement and strong mechanisms may not
necessarily be the best strategies for inducing compliance.195 Instead, under
certain conditions, “soft law” mechanisms could be more effective in

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 123.
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establishing durable norms196 that persist even in the absence of material
inducement.197 Thus, progressing from softer mechanisms to stronger ones
is not just born out of political necessity but also congruent with
institutional design theories and effectiveness.
The proposed framework evolves in stages of increasing strength as
sociocultural and ideological consensus builds around protection, and not
just promotion of human rights. This allows acculturation to serve as the
precursor to persuasion and material inducement, enhancing the
effectiveness of the latter two processes.198 After a global model is adopted
by states through acculturation, social movements can persuade
governments to uphold their commitments by framing their cause as
“congruent with human rights principles that are now part of the nation’s
existing value system.”199 Acculturation can also “develop communitywide schema—for the evaluation of human rights standards, legal
violations, and acceptable justifications—thus sharpening the framework
needed by a system of material incentives to operate most effectively.”200
Indeed, the evolutionary path of the European Convention on Human
Rights and its member states exhibits that the “delayed onset of material
inducement” can be beneficial.201
The Regional System should avoid reliance on a single entity—the
ASEAN Commission. Gaps due to normative dissensus (category two
decoupling) may require exposing multiple levels of society to global
models of “appropriate human rights behavior.”202 Engaging multiple
complementary channels of influence and increasing coordination between
them is essential to build support inside and outside ASEAN to create push
and pull effects203 that effectively change state behavior. The push and pull
effect is analogized from the Keynesian economic concepts of cost-push
inflation and demand-pull inflation.204 In ASEAN’s human rights context,
it refers to pressures from ASEAN’s internal and external spheres that
“reinforce[] an equilibrium-imperative upon ASEAN to reject impunity by
196. Id.
197. Id. at 129.
198. See id. at 165, 182.
199. See id. at 165.
200. See id. at 182.
201. Id.; see Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 314–17 (1997).
202. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 161.
203. This Note builds on push and pull effects proposed in Diane A. Desierto, Universalizing Core
Human Rights in the “New” ASEAN: A Reassessment of Culture and Development Justifications
Against the Global Rejection of Impunity, 1 GOT̈ TINGEN J. INT’L LAW 77, 86 (2009).
204. Id.
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‘universalizing’ core human rights norms.”205
In sum, the framework recommends a strategic sequence of human
rights mechanisms and procedural reforms for the ASEAN Commission
complemented by other actors that work along with or independently of the
Commission. Section A contains the proposal for the ASEAN
Commission’s stages of evolution, while Section B proposes strategies
other actors and institutions can adopt to complement the ASEAN
Commission.
A. Proposal for the evolution of the ASEAN Commission
A preliminary task for the ASEAN Commission is to assert itself in
the norm-building process. Standards must be unified before they can be
promoted and implemented through human rights mechanisms. By using its
promotional mandate to uphold international human rights standards and
enhance regional cooperation,206 the ASEAN Commission could draft
general comments (as treaty monitoring bodies do)207 that give quasiauthoritative interpretations of the ASEAN Declaration in a progressive
manner that is at least consistent with international human rights standards.
General comments are important, especially given the need to unify and
clarify the ASEAN Declaration’s fractured standards. The ASEAN
Commission should also consider creative alternatives for norm creation,
such as mainstreaming, if it meets roadblocks through traditional
methods.208
The proposed plan for the ASEAN Commission is divided into human
rights mechanisms and procedural reforms. These can be implemented
independently and at different times, though they would serve to
complement each other. Some of these reforms can be within the
Commission’s existing mandate, but most would require further action by
ASEAN member states. Procedural reforms may be easier to implement
because they may entail fewer sovereignty costs and do not require
substantive reforms. They also increase access to information and
participation by other actors, which may spur the adoption of human rights
mechanisms. The human rights mechanisms promote, monitor, or

205. Id.
206. See ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 1.5–1.6.
207. See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 83–84.
208. Id. at 87–88. Mainstreaming is the process in which “human rights penetrate arenas of action
that previously did not explicitly consider human rights questions.” Id. at 88. For example, some
organizations that do not have explicit human rights mandates, such as the World Health Organization
and the World Bank, engage in human rights work and employ human rights language, thus spreading
human rights norms though non-explicit processes. Id. at 87–88.
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implement human rights standards and are intended to be evolutionary;
they can be implemented sequentially, independently, and progressively
(not just over time).
1. Procedural reforms
The ASEAN Commission can reform (1) access to information and
(2) participation. 209 However, ASEAN may be unwilling to incorporate
them as formal rights.210 Nevertheless, the procedural reforms could still be
gradually incorporated as more informal guidelines and processes in the
existing ASEAN Commission protocol.
First, the ASEAN Commission could expand access to information for
CSOs and the public. Currently, ASEAN has a set of guidelines for how
CSOs and ASEAN can interact.211 These guidelines provide that qualifying
CSOs may have access to official ASEAN documentation on a selective
basis, and some documentation such as declarations and policy statements
are available to the public through the ASEAN website.212 However,
internal decision-making and discussions at the ASEAN Commission are
kept secret and released only in the form of press releases.213 The ASEAN
Commission should create channels through which the public and CSOs
can request for more information, and also make decision-making
processes more transparent by providing access to meeting minutes.214
Second, ASEAN could relax the rules on participation for CSOs and
the public. Currently, qualifying CSOs can submit written statements or
recommendations on policy issues to ASEAN and participate in ASEAN

209. These procedural reforms build on the three pillars of procedural rights outlined in the Aarhus
Convention. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered
into force Oct. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]; see Aarhus Convention: About the
Convention: Content, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, http://www.unece.org/
env/pp/contentofaarhus.html (last visited February 27, 2015) (explaining the three “pillars” of
procedural rights in the Aarhus Convention); see also Tarik Abdel-Monem, ASEAN’s Gradual
Evolution: Challenges and opportunities for integrating Participatory Procedural Reforms For The
Environment In An Evolving Rights-based Framework, 29 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 234, 259 (2012)
(suggesting application of the Aarhus Convention to the ASEAN Commission). The Aarhus Convention
includes a third pillar, justice, which will not be discussed here because it requires creation of judicial or
administrative procedures that mostly overlap with the human rights mechanisms suggested infra Part
III.A.2.
210. Abdel-Monem, supra note 209, at 270–71.
211. ASEAN, Guidelines on ASEAN’s Relations with Civil Society Organizations, http://www.uniglobal-post.org/upload/meeting_in_manila_verweis8.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
212. Abdel-Monem, supra note 209, at 272.
213. Id. at 273.
214. Id. at 273–74.
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meetings at ASEAN’s discretion.215 To qualify, CSOs have to be officially
affiliated with ASEAN and must “advance ASEAN interests and promote
the awareness of ASEAN’s principles and activities.”216 Critics have
observed that state governments created many of these qualified CSOs,
whose participation in dialogues is merely a symbolic gesture.217 To date,
the Working Group is the only human rights CSO affiliated with
ASEAN.218 ASEAN should allow more CSOs to qualify for participation in
its decision-making processes. At the very least, the ASEAN Commission
could give CSOs observer status in its meetings. In addition, the ASEAN
Commission could allow the public or CSOs to submit written comments
about their concerns and member state practices, and make these
submissions publicly available.219 This could function as CSO-driven
annual reporting to the ASEAN Commission on human rights issues.220
Although the Terms of Reference for the ASEAN Commission do not
mention participation rights, the ASEAN Charter explicitly refers to
principles allowing for public participation in ASEAN community
building.221 The state-appointed internal advisory committee for ASEAN—
the Eminent Persons Group—has also recommended that ASEAN enhance
the participation of CSOs, academic institutions, and Parliamentarians in
ASEAN Member States (AIPA).222 Thus, these procedural changes could
have sufficient support to be feasible in the short term.
2. Human rights mechanisms
The existing Regional Systems show that the strength of a Regional
System is the consequence, not cause, of the strength of national
governments’ commitment.223 Also, there is an inherent tradeoff between
the scope and strength of mechanisms; the wider the scope of countries
covered, the weaker the mechanism.224 The ASEAN Commission has a
wide scope of coverage; ASEAN prefers the inclusionary approach where
all member states participate in the ASEAN Commission,225 which covers a

215. Id. at 274–75.
216. Id. at 275.
217. Id. at 275–76.
218. ASEAN, supra note 53 at Annex 2.
219. Abdel-Monem, supra note 209, at 276.
220. Id. at 276–77.
221. Id. at 269–70 (quoting the preamble of the Charter and other articles on the purpose of
ASEAN).
222. Id.
223. See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 99, 108.
224. Id. at 110–11.
225. See PHAN, supra note 17, at 233.
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broad range of human rights issues. Consequently, the strength of the
mechanisms will be limited.226
Thus, even though strong mechanisms such as regional courts would
seem ideal for any Regional System, the ASEAN Commission should start
with less intrusive, non-judicial mechanisms. The ASEAN Commission
may be more successful if it engages governments in ways that appear less
intrusive to state sovereignty, and then develop the system in stages. As
other Regional Systems did not become strong overnight, the ASEAN
Commission “would not be the first of the world’s regional human rights
bodies to achieve an effective human rights body by accretion, not
design.”227
The following table describes human rights mechanisms that could be
adopted for the ASEAN system over time, in order of increasing strength.
Human
Rights
Mechanisms

Description

Publishing
best practices

Apart from influencing the standardization of norms,228
publishing best practices can provide states that are
interested in fulfilling their obligations with useful
information on effectiveness and implementation. This is
a “highly soft” mechanism229 that does not have coercive
power and depends entirely on the willingness of states to
make use of the available information. However, the
emulation of best practices could be more durable than
policy shifts caused by coercion and could persist even
when pressure fades.230 Publishing best practices could
also lay the foundation for stronger mechanisms, by
“establish[ing] standards of conduct around which
coercive measures can be organized.”231

226.
power”).
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See id. at 168 (arguing that “[a]n inclusive approach generally produces a body with less
Renshaw, supra note 144, at 18.
GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 130.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 691.

14_WANG_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

CONTEXTUALIZING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

6/22/2015 9:48 PM

413

Review of
state-initiated
reports

This mechanism primarily serves a “limited, noncoercive
monitoring” function,232 where a state submits reports of
its human rights record, actions taken to improve the
human rights conditions within its borders, or compliance
with a treaty.233 This mechanism works by creating
negative publicity (shaming) for states that are
noncompliant.234

Fact-finding
visits and/or
investigative
reports

Unlike review of state-initiated reports, this mechanism
does not give the state as much control over what
information is collected on the state’s human rights
record. However, it usually requires state consent for the
relevant institution to access that information.235 The
states need not always adopt the recommendations from
the investigations, and thus the mechanism depends on
the willingness of states to cooperate.236

Friendly
settlement
procedure/
mediation

Some major human rights treaties and the Inter-American
Commission provide for mediation, or “good offices” as
an option for settling disputes and complaints.237 This
mechanism works through persuasion, where the
institution’s high-level officials or commissioners seek to
influence state governments by facilitating dialogue
about controversial practices.238

232. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 82.
233. See Basic Facts about the UPR, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 20,
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx.
234. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 78.
235. See Human Rights Bodies: Complaint Procedures, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS (July 12, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTB
Petitions.aspx (“Inquiries may only be undertaken with respect to States parties who have recognized
the competence of the relevant Committee in this regard.”). U.N. Special Procedures have to obtain an
invitation from the particular government before conducting a country visit for fact-finding purposes.
Country and Visits of Special Procedures, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/CountryandothervisitsSP.aspx.
236. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 79.
237. Article 48(1)(f) of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 28(1)(b) of the
European Convention of Human Rights call for the friendly settlement of complaints, and Article
41(1)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows parties to use its good
offices. Patricia Ravenhorst, International Human Rights Law Versus National Sovereignty: Can The
Friendly Settlement Mechanism Relieve The Tension? 18 (2000) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Duke
University) (on file with Library Service Center, Duke University).
238. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 127.
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For the Inter-American System, states are incentivized to
use this option and reach an agreement.239 Failure to
settle in mediation would allow the Commission to take
stronger actions, such as publishing detailed public
reports and non-binding recommendations, or referring
the dispute to the Inter-American Court, if the state has
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.240 The potential for
private settlements makes mediation more palatable than
the following mechanisms, which involve public shaming
or formal adjudication.241
These three mechanisms for complaints are standard for
most U.N. treaty bodies.242 The inter-state complaint
mechanism allows state parties to complain to a treaty
body about alleged violations by another state party.243
The individual communications mechanism allows
“anyone”—individuals, and sometimes NGOs or other
representatives—to file a complaint against a state party
that has accepted this procedure, for rights violations
covered by the relevant treaty.244 After a treaty body
receives the complaint, it corresponds with the state,
inquires with independent sources, and issues
recommendations.245 However, the recommendations are
not binding in international law, and states do not have to
respond to the body.246 The inquiry mechanism allows a
treaty body to initiate confidential inquiries on its own
accord “if [it] ha[s] received reliable information
containing well-founded indications of serious or
systematic violations” of the relevant treaty.247 This
mechanism depends on the “cooperation of the [s]tate
party . . . at all stages” of the inquiry.248

Ravenhorst, supra note 237, at 22–23.
Id.
See id. at 22–24.
Human Rights Bodies: Complaint Procedures, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx (last visited July
12, 2014).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 85.
246. Id.
247. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 242.
248. Id.
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The strongest enforcement mechanism that Regional
Systems have employed involves a court that can make
findings of violations and legally binding decisions for
states subject to its jurisdiction.249 Strong political will is
a prerequisite for this mechanism, because it not only
allows the human rights institution to publicly criticize
the state, but also forces the state to adopt remedial
procedures that may be costly. In addition, a binding
instrument such as a convention or treaty that outlines the
legal obligations of the state parties must precede the
court before it can hold state parties legally accountable.
The court’s jurisdiction is based on state consent, and
individuals may or may not have standing to sue states
directly through the regional courts.250 The three main
Regional Systems all have regional courts.

The mechanisms above persuade, encourage, or coerce states to
comply with norms. They may have spillover effects on norm building but
do not directly focus on the latter.251 These mechanisms are by no means
exhaustive and do not include the strategies that informal and diplomatic
channels can employ.252 The abovementioned mechanisms can be
introduced in three stages, as categorized below—short-term, mid-term,
and long-term.
a. Short-term evolution
Promotional activities are a natural starting point because they are less
threatening to the status quo.253 Since the ASEAN Commission’s mandate
is mainly promotional, the Commission could use its existing powers to
build and standardize norms. The Commission should encourage states to
accept norms that are stronger than non-binding guidelines, by encouraging
ratification of existing U.N. treaties relating to human rights, or further

249. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 123.
250. See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text.
251. While activities that build on or standardize substantive legal norms are essential, the process
of norm building is complex and entails a different set of considerations that calls for an independent
study. Part III of this Note will offer some general suggestions as to when and where the norm-building
process should happen in relation to the rest of the human rights mechanisms, for example, suggesting
that the ASEAN Commission provide general comments to the ASEAN Declaration.
252. For example, tying Preferential Trade Agreements with human rights implementation. See
Hafner-Burton, supra note 80, at 278; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, supra note 93.
253. Thio, supra note 19, at 76.
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refining the ASEAN Declaration into more concrete practices and
guidelines.254 The ASEAN Commission should also engage civil society to
help form consensus around norms on national levels.255 As some
negotiators have suggested, the ASEAN Commission can also expand on
its existing work by creatively interpreting its mandate to perform functions
that are not forbidden, such as investigating, reporting, and arbitrating.256
The ASEAN Commission could also start with “soft” mechanisms that
have lower costs for state sovereignty, such as developing and publishing
best practices. States with better human rights records or stronger political
will could find these best practices useful, and if they start adopting them,
other ASEAN states may be socialized to follow suit.257 The ASEAN
Commission has started to encourage the sharing of best practices through
workshops that involve other Regional Systems and civil society.258
However, the contents of these discussions are not publicized on the
Commission’s website. This limits the public’s ability to monitor progress.
Such best practices should be made public so that civil society can use
them as a tool to accelerate state adoption of these practices.
The ASEAN Commission can then introduce the reporting mechanism
to facilitate the “open exchange of ideas and experiences.”259 A state’s very
process of identifying and reflecting on its human rights practices
encourages compliance.260 All ASEAN states, as members of the United
Nations, are already required to submit a report of their human rights
conditions to the United Nations every four years.261 States that have
ratified human rights treaties have an additional obligation to submit
reports to the relevant treaty-based bodies.262 However, the ASEAN
Commission’s mandate does not expressly authorize it to require states to

254. This would help solidify norms and bridge the gap between norms and implementation.
255. This is because domestic human rights development strengthens the Regional System.
Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177.
256. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 12–13.
257. This is mostly likely to occur as the social pressure of other states’ actions drive acculturation,
where “actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.” GOODMAN & JINKS,
supra note 4, at 22.
258. Press Release, ASEAN Intergovernmental Comm’n on Human Rights, The AICHR Workshop
on Regional Mechanisms: Best Practices on Implementation of Human Rights (with Partial Support
from UN Women and Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument) (Nov. 21, 2014), http://aichr.org/
report/press-release-the-aichr-workshop-on-regional-mechanisms-best-practices-on-implementation-ofhuman-rights-with-partial-support-from-un-women-and-regional-eu-asean-dialogue-instrument/.
259. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 127.
260. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 82–83.
261. This refers to the U.N. Periodic Review process. Id. at 78.
262. Id. at 81.
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report on their human rights records or review the states’ reports.263 Thus,
the ASEAN Commission would need to creatively interpret its mandate to
add this mechanism to its toolbox.
To make the state-driven reporting mechanism more palatable, the
ASEAN Commission could emphasize that, if given this power, it would
serve to complement rather than duplicate the existing reporting obligations
to the United Nations and treaty bodies. Some have argued that the
reporting mechanism is likely ineffective against states with poor human
rights records, since their civil society, which amplifies publicity of the
reports, is less robust.264 Also, reporting does not impose sanctions apart
from negative publicity, which may be insufficient to overcome the
political benefits of violating human rights.265 However, the limited power
of this mechanism may work in favor of its adoption. Because states
prepare the reports, they have the power to pick and choose what goes into
them. This is a chance for the states to skew the narrative in favor of their
human rights records,266 at least before the ASEAN Commission reviews
them. For states that want to reframe the narrative or are proud of some
portion of their records, this opportunity may be too good to decline.
b. Mid-term evolution
After achieving a minimum degree of success at unifying human
rights norms within ASEAN, the ASEAN Commission could move on to
this stage when its role expands from promotion to protection. Since the
ASEAN Commission could submit, in addition to an annual report of its
activities, “other reports if deemed necessary,” it could creatively interpret
this language to include the power to submit investigatory reports of
country conditions.267 Alternatively, ASEAN could expressly empower the
ASEAN Commission to conduct investigations and determine violations to
generate a report, with recommendations for state action. The three main
regional commissions have all employed this mechanism,268 which shows
that it could be feasible for the ASEAN system as well. Even though the
states do not control the narrative of their human rights records at this

263. See Croydon, supra note 69, at 29.
264. See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 83 (noting that reporting “is most likely to have an impact
where it is not critically needed: that is, where human rights records are relatively good.”).
265. Id.
266. States can do this through omission of bad facts, emphasizing areas of progress, and/or lying.
267. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 4.13.
268. Although the European Commission of Human Rights has ceased to exist (since it merged
into the European Court of Human Rights in 1998), it did employ the mechanism discussed here while
it was in operation.
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stage, they need not adopt the recommendations from the investigations.269
However, as long as the reports are made publicly available, the negative
publicity generated from the findings could be sufficient to force states to
respond to the situation.
For example, the Inter-American Commission demonstrated the power
of the court of public opinion when it published reports of murderous
political projects in Latin America in the 1970s.270 The Inter-American
Commission construed its vaguely-worded mandate to empower itself with
the ability to prepare reports on the human rights conditions in members
states.271 Using the reporting tool, the Inter-American Commission turned
itself into an accusatory “[h]emispheric [g]rand [j]ury, storming around
Latin America to vacuum up evidence of high crimes,”272 shocking the
repressive governments that created it.273 The reports drove some officials
who were responsible for the violations to cease and flee the country.274
The major challenge would be changing the audience of the reports from
being restricted to ASEAN Foreign Ministers275 to the general public.
Again, ASEAN would have to muster sufficient political will to allow the
public to examine its human rights record.
The ASEAN Commission should also fully utilize thematic or special
working groups and subcommittees, such as the ASEAN Committee on
Migrant Workers.276 Subcommittees cover a narrower range of issues and
could thus employ stronger mechanisms early on, such as making reports
and conducting fact-finding visits. These committees and working groups
could include experts, CSOs, and academics, thereby delegating the
difficult tasks away from the political ASEAN Commission towards more
neutral, independent groups that could act more quickly. These working
groups could emulate the best practices of the U.N. Human Rights
Council’s special working groups and rapporteurs, who are individuals or
small groups of independent experts that use this mechanism to investigate

269. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 79.
270. Farer, supra note 148, at 511–12.
271. Id. at 511.
272. Id. at 512.
273. Id. at 511.
274. Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 172 n.96 (citing Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on
the Sitution of Human Rights in Argentina, pts. A(3), B, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49 doc. 19 (Apr. 11, 1980)).
275. Currently, the ASEAN Commission can only submit reports to the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 4.13.
276. In 2007, ASEAN established this committee, which meets annually. ASEAN Committee on
Migrant Workers, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASEAN ONLINE PLATFORM (Feb. 22, 2014), http://humanrights
inasean.info/asean-committee-migrant-workers/about.html.
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human rights issues related to specific themes or countries.277
The inter-state complaint mechanism should likely not be used, given
its zero utilization rate in treaty-monitoring bodies.278 It is also
unimaginable that ASEAN’s strong adherence to non-interference and
peaceful resolution279 would permit states to accuse each other of
violations. However, this stage could allow individuals to file human rights
complaints with the ASEAN Commission.
The strength of the complaint mechanism could be limited by giving
states the option to resolve the case privately through mediation. Instead of
having the ASEAN Commission investigate complaints and make its
recommendations public, using the ASEAN Commission as a mediator
allows the state to reach a private resolution with the complainant. States
would be motivated to respond to complaints and settle in mediation
because failing to do so would result in the ASEAN Commission
publicizing its findings and recommendations. If states refuse to settle in
mediation or respond to the complaint, states will suffer the reputational
costs of being declared a violator, but no sanction beyond that. It is difficult
to threaten states with anything else, because ASEAN has been reluctant to
sanction members, even for gross violations, such as those that occurred in
Myanmar.280
Although the international community has largely ignored this
procedure,281 it could be highly relevant and feasible for the ASEAN
system, which prefers peaceful and friendly resolutions with minimal
intrusiveness. Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission has employed
this mechanism successfully in a dispute involving Argentina, resulting in
compensation for the victims.282 Since states have a say in how the alleged

277. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 78–79. There are thirty-nine thematic and fourteen country
mandates as of October 2014, spanning civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights. Special
Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx.
278. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 242.
279. See supra Part I.C.1.
280. ASEAN accepted Myanmar’s application for membership despite the Myanmar coup and
human rights violations associated with it. Thio, supra note 19, at 40. For a detailed account of
Myanmar’s acceptance into ASEAN despite its human rights record, including detention of opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, see Arendshorst, supra note 109.
281. Ravenhorst, supra note 237, at 5.
282. See Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., Report on the Friendly Settlement Procedure in Cases 10.288,
10.310, 10.436, 10.496, 10.631, and 10.711, No. 1/93, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1993). In these
cases, the petitioners argued that the Argentine government failed to provide effective judicial remedies
to victims of arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Argentine government agreed to the friendly
settlement procedure. Id. The negotiations concluded with a commitment by the Argentine government
to provide for the payment of compensation to the petitioners, and after the Inter-American Commission
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violation is resolved, mediation is less intrusive upon state sovereignty and
less adversarial when compared to court.283 Mediation could also provide a
direct remedy for victims.284 However, the ASEAN Commission should
closely monitor the mediation process to offset any coercive power
differential between the government and the complainants. Mediation also
has its drawbacks. Since mediation is confidential and settlements have no
precedential value, it has the potential to shield states from national and
international scrutiny, and does not contribute to the development of human
rights law jurisprudence.285 Furthermore, compensation for victims places a
monetary price on violations, allowing the states to purchase violations,
treating compensation as the cost of doing business the way they prefer.286
c. Long-term evolution
This is the mature stage, which employs the strongest enforcement
mechanism—a court. The regional court will issue binding decisions on
states, possibly interpreting a binding regional instrument such as a
convention. The ASEAN Commission could push for ratification of a
regional convention, with an opt-in provision for submitting to a regional
court’s jurisdiction. Although the court’s strength and jurisdiction could be
restricted at the beginning, this stage nevertheless requires sufficient
political will from states to allow a court to make substantial intrusions into
state sovereignty.
Determining when to progress in the evolutionary sequence is a
difficult task. It is impossible to propose a one-size-fits-all approach to this
question, but lessons from other Regional Systems indicate that political
will and ideological consensus are the requisite conditions that determine
progress from one stage to another.287 These other Regional Systems
counsel patience in waiting for conditions to ripen.
Yet, sometimes a progressive change is needed to prevent stagnation.
Generally, softer mechanisms usually do not require much in terms of
political will.288 However, to move from promotion to protection
necessitates “significant sacrifices” from the states, and typically requires
“external material power or internal substantive commitment” to overcome

monitored the government’s progress and actual payment, the Commission closed the case. Id.
283. Ravenhorst, supra note 237, at 16–17.
284. Id.
285. See id.
286. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 178–79.
287. DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 105–08.
288. Id. at 105.
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“strong barriers at the threshold.”289 In addition, there has to be some level
of homogeneity in sociocultural and ideological consensus290 so that the
norms can be implemented in a consistent manner. At the very least, there
needs to be a regional human rights “culture.”291 Though these conditions
can be difficult to satisfy, the ASEAN human rights system is not
necessarily immobilized. Instead of passively waiting for ideal conditions
to materialize, the ASEAN Commission could socialize states within
ASEAN to best practices, and other actors and institutions could hasten or
create the conditions necessary for the ASEAN Commission’s evolution.
B. Role of other actors and institutions
In other Regional Systems, national institutions, civil society, and
external factors propelled the development of formal regional
mechanisms.292 These other actors can play an instrumental role in creating
the conditions necessary for the ASEAN Commission to progress in the
evolutionary sequence. There are four levels of actors and institutions—
grassroots, national, regional, and international—that can generate the push
and pull effects from inside and outside ASEAN.293 Grassroots and national
efforts within ASEAN can generate an internal push towards building a
regional consensus around norms and mechanisms. The international
community and the Asia Pacific Forum, a network of NHRIs in the Asia
Pacific,294 can generate an external pull from outside ASEAN towards
similar ends.
1. Grassroots level: CSOs
CSOs should create a human rights culture that starts at the grassroots
level and “permeates both the citizenry and [the] officialdom.”295 To
achieve this, CSOs should continue to lobby for increased access to
information and participation in official (inter)governmental dialogue and
in the ASEAN Commission. The Working Group for an ASEAN Human
Rights Mechanism, which currently has participatory rights in ASEAN,
should leverage this opportunity to increase the voice of CSOs. CSOs also
have an entry point in the Asia Pacific Forum,296 and could use the Forum’s

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 108.
Id.
Thio, supra note 19, at 78.
Aguirre and Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177.
See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text.
See generally Durbach et al., supra note 43.
Id.
Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 233.
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influence on NHRIs to achieve bottom-up advocacy for human rights.297
Also, CSOs should fill the information gap in reporting, documenting, and
researching local human rights conditions, so as to generate a concern for
human rights from within ASEAN. A strong civil society and a culture of
human rights could hold state governments accountable when they make
disingenuous commitments,298 such as using the ASEAN Commission as a
tool to relieve pressure for real change. ASEAN’s creation of the ASEAN
Commission and the ASEAN Declaration can result in a “shift in domestic
political opportunity structure”299 by opening new avenues for domestic
CSOs. Specifically, these formal commitments to human rights legitimize
human rights norms and the CSOs that champion them. Furthermore,
shallow commitments to human rights norms can evolve into deeper
commitments through the “civilizing force of hypocrisy,”300 where the
public demand for consistency in official commitments makes hypocritical
commitment unsustainable.301 CSOs can leverage citizens’ expectation that
public officials live up to their public rhetoric to turn hypocritical
endorsement of human rights norms into actual commitments.302 ASEAN
states’ shallow commitments to human rights represent partial victories for
human rights movements. These victories, rather than relieving pressure
from CSOs, can often have a ratcheting-up effect where civil society
escalates its demands, enabling a norm that is merely acceptable to become
encouraged, and eventually unequivocally required.303
2. National level: NHRIs and domestic courts
Member states should strengthen existing NHRIs and encourage the
formation of new ones. NHRIs are beneficial because they can be
monitored through the Paris Principles, which are international standards
for NHRIs.304 Since they are also closer to the ground, they can experiment
with creative ways to implement international human rights norms while
respecting local culture.305 As laboratories for experiments, they can test
out which ideas could work for the region, and then transmit them to the

297. See Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15.
298. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
299. See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 145.
300. Id. at 150; Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
97, 111 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
301. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 150.
302. See id. at 150–51.
303. Id. at 155–56.
304. Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 237–38.
305. Id.
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ASEAN Commission and the Asia Pacific Forum.306
Coordination among NHRIs is essential to prevent fragmented
interpretation and enforcement of regionally-recognized rights. The
ASEAN NHRI Forum, consisting of the four accredited NHRIs in the
ASEAN region, should include Myanmar’s NHRI in its activities and help
Myanmar’s NHRI achieve accreditation status.307 The ASEAN
Commission could also support national courts that enforce human rights.
For example, Indonesia has a human rights court that tries “gross violations
of human rights that consist of genocide and crimes against humanity.”308
However, in 2006, a U.N. Commission of Experts found that Indonesia’s
human rights court’s prosecution lacked commitment and expertise in the
subject matter.309 The ASEAN Commission could provide these national
courts with resources such as training to boost their currently weak capacity
for hearing human rights cases.310 However, a key caveat for developing
NHRIs and domestic courts is that they are highly dependent on states’
willingness to grant them the level of independence and autonomy that they
require.
3. Regional level: coordination with the Asia Pacific Forum and the
ACWC
The ACWC’s mandate and functions should be clarified to avoid any
overlap with that of the ASEAN Commission, since such overlap could
mean that neither organization can be held directly accountable for a lack
of progress. This would require coordination between ACWC, the ASEAN
Commission, and relevant ASEAN decision makers. A second regional
actor is the Asia Pacific Forum. ASEAN regularly invites the ASEAN
NHRI Forum to participate in consultations.311 The Asia Pacific Forum,
through the ASEAN NHRI Forum, can influence ASEAN and has begun to
function as a watchdog for ASEAN.312 Suggested functions for the Asia
306. Croydon, supra note 69, at 32.
307. Currently, Myanmar’s National Institution does not conform to the Paris Principles, and thus
does not have full membership in the Asia Pacific Forum. See ASIA PACIFIC FORUM, supra note 51.
Helping Mynamar’s National Institution achieve accreditation would strengthen Mynamar’s human
rights activism since accreditation requires independence from the state and a minimum standard of
competence. See INT’L COORDINATING COMM., supra note 49.
308. Mahdev Mohan, HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, RULE OF LAW FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE ASEAN REGION: A BASE-LINE STUDY94, available at http://hrrca.org/system/files/Rule_of_Law_
for_Human_Rights_in_the_ASEAN_Region.pdf.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Croydon, supra note 69, at 31.
312. Id. Some of the areas in which the Asia Pacific Forum has influenced human rights in
ASEAN include: “encouragement of NHRIs compliant with the Paris Principles in ASEAN member
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Pacific Forum include “becom[ing] the voice that seeks to enhance . . .
ASEAN human rights institutions, . . . infiltrating the ranks of ASEAN and
seeking to improve from within, generat[ing] greater pressure on the former
externally . . . by regularly sending reports to the U.N. on the state of
ASEAN’s initiative.”313
4. International level: actors outside ASEAN
International pressure creates political will among ASEAN leaders to
address human rights issues.314 The U.N. bodies, the international
community, and other Regional Systems could continue to assert lateral
pressure from outside ASEAN through socialization techniques such as
acculturation and persuasion. As international enforcement of human rights
strengthens, ASEAN would likely feel pressured to keep up with the rest of
the world—even if ASEAN lags behind the rest of the world on a relative
level, ASEAN’s commitment to human rights could improve in absolute
terms.315 Also, as non-ASEAN states learn that ASEAN’s nominal
commitment do not signal genuine acceptance of human rights norms,
these states could require ASEAN to enact increasingly meaningful reforms
to capture the same social benefits.316
The international community can also increase the effectiveness of
social pressure by increasing the strength, immediacy, and size of the
reference group that ASEAN aspires to emulate.317 ASEAN currently looks
to the other Regional Systems as the reference group, specifically invoking
the European Union (EU) as the group to aspire to.318 The EU has and
should continue to reach out to ASEAN to share its experience and best
practices in human rights systems, as an extension of EU-ASEAN political
and economic ties.319 Other Regional Systems are also engaging with the
ASEAN Commission, starting with simple dialogue and workshops.320
states where these still do not exist; monitoring ASEAN’s delivery on promises such as, for example,
the one it made through the Cebu Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant
Workers; and correction of AICHR’s shortcomings with regards to power, mandate and output.” Id.
313. See id.
314. See Aung, supra note 167 (describing a Myanmar human rights activist’s view that “without
international pressure, ASEAN leaders have no will to address human rights issues”).
315. See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 141–42.
316. See id. at 156.
317. See id. at 28.
318. Munro, supra note 81, at 23.
319. FOSTERING HUMAN RIGHTS AMONG EUROPEAN POLICIES [FRAME], REPORT ON THE MAPPING
STUDY ON RELEVANT ACTORS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 42 (2014), http://www.fp7-frame.eu/
wp-content/materiale/reports/02-Deliverable-4.1.pdf.
320. Experts from Inter-American, European, and African Regional Systems participated in a
workshop to share and exchange best practices. See The AICHR Workshop on Regional Mechanisms,
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Although non-ASEAN governments cannot fund the ASEAN
Commission’s protection of human rights, they can channel funds to local
CSOs and other avenues that need resources. International civil society
should also strengthen its relationship with ASEAN states. For example,
encouraging membership in international nongovernmental organizations
would publicize local violations and hold state governments accountable.321
CONCLUSION
This Note examines a puzzle—how a region allergic to human rights
could design an effective human rights system. It proposes an ASEAN
regional human rights framework in light of ASEAN’s regional
particularities and challenges, its institutional limitations and fractured
norms, and lessons from other Regional Systems. The result is a strategic
choice and sequence of human rights mechanisms and procedural reforms
for the ASEAN Commission, complemented by multilayered institutions
and actors that exert external, internal, and bottom-up influence.
Although much care has been taken in designing this proposed
framework, it is nevertheless limited by open questions in the institutional
design literature. The institutional design of law, such as the degree of
delegation and flexibility, involves tradeoffs not yet well understood.322
Debates about the causal mechanisms through which regimes influence
human rights, such as coercion and persuasion, are inconclusive.323 Also,
there is a lot of variation in how states participate in legal regimes in terms
of which regimes they choose and how deeply they commit.324 This
variation, especially in the sovereignty costs of participation, may affect the
suitability of legal flexibility mechanisms and is not yet fully explored.325
The proposed framework would benefit from future research in these
relevant areas.
A Regional System has to garner enough state support to exist and
function, but it cannot prostrate itself before the states and ignore state
violations. The difficulty lies in striking the balance. The proposed
framework seeks to help ASEAN’s system find the elusive equilibrium—
the delicate balance between global norms and local conditions—gradually
and sequentially. The framework reconciles international standards and
local particularities through selective sequencing and combination of multisupra note 258.
321. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
322. Hafner-Burton, supra note 80, at 279.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 271.
325. Id.
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layered actors. This approach may be relevant to developing human rights
systems for regions that still lack them, such as the Arab Middle East and
Asia as a whole.

